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The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance Based on 
Individual Savings Account: Lessons from Chile 
 





In recent years, unemployment protection systems based on individual savings have 
been instituted in several developing countries. Chile was one of the first to establish 
such a system, which at the time was widely cited as a model for other countries. This 
articlediscusses the particular political context in which the Chilean system was created 
before examining how itworks in terms of coverage and levels of benefitsreceived by 
unemployed workers. The authorsundertake a detailed analysis of the administrative 
data produced by the system and conclude that the insurance covers only a small 
proportion of the unemployed, as most workers generally had precarious jobs that did 
not allow them to contribute to the system consistently. The Chilean case illustrates how 
difficult it is to establish functioning unemployment insurance in developing countries 
with precarious labour markets. Based on the interaction between employment 
characteristics and the conditions imposed by the benefit system, the article assessesthe 
efficacy of the Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts (UISA) systemand analyses 
whether it can indeed serve as a model for other developing countries. 
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In recent years, several middle-income developing countries have implemented 
unemployment insurance systems based on a financing mechanism which relies 
principally on individual savings accounts (ISAs). In some cases, these savings accounts 
are complemented by a minimal shared funding mechanism (a ‘solidarity pillar’) that 
aims to even out the risk of unemployment among the insured. These unemployment 
compensation systems have been much lauded and promoted by multilateral 
international institutions,1because they are considered to be easy to establish and 
administer, have low fiscal funding requirements, and limit the risk of moral hazard 
associated with more traditional insurance systems.The literature on unemployment 
insurance systems in the developing world generally expresses concern that the risk of 
moral hazard is higher in countries where the institutional capacity to monitor the job 
search behaviour of the unemployed is more limited (Holzmann and Vodopivec, 2012). 
Systems based on ISAs, such as the Chilean one, are expected to lower the risk of moral 
hazard, thus constituting a more feasible solution to the dilemma of unemployment in 
developing countries.  
 
As the first system to be implemented that combined ISAs with a ‘Solidarity Fund’ 
designed to provide minimum levels of coverage to workers who had not been able to 
accumulate enough savings in their individual accounts, the Chilean unemployment 
insurance savings account (UISA) system provides an excellent case study for Latin 
America, and also for other developing countries. Chile has historically had an 
exceptional status in the Latin American region as a ‘pioneer’ of privatized social 
security systems to which so-called ‘solidarity pillars’ have been added over time, 
which provide basic social protection floors for those not covered by their own savings.2 
In the same way that Chile’s pension system was once regarded as a model for other 
developing countries, its unemployment insurance has now also been copied elsewhere. 
For example, Colombia legislated in 2013 to institute a system based on ISAs, while 
                                                     
1 In 2001, the International Labour Organization (ILO) described the Chilean unemployment 
insurance system as ‘new legislation that could lead to a new generation of reforms in 
unemployment insurance matters’ (ILO, 2001: 50). See also Vodopivec (2013) for a succinct 
summary of this literature. 
2 See Contreras and Sehnbruch (2013) for a detailed discussion of how Chilean social security 
systems developed between 1990 and 2010. 
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Mexico has legislated that it will implement such a system in the near future. Mauritius 
implemented a similar system in 2009 (known as the ‘Workfare Programme’), while Sri 
Lanka is still debating the precise form of the unemployment insurance system 
itwilladopt (Vodopivec, 2013). As we now have enough administrative data to analyse 
how well the system is working, it is important to examine whether the Chilean system 
can indeed serve as a model for other developing countries. 
 
This article therefore dedicates an extensive part of the discussion to an analysis of the 
political circumstances that led to the implementation of the Chilean UISA system. As 
will be explained below, the system’s design responds to a very particular constellation 
of concerns about labour market flexibilization and the potential for abuse of social 
protection systems, as well as the limited institutional capacity characteristic of Chile 
during the 1990s. 
 
The articleuses administrative data to examine the extent to which unemployed workers 
benefit from the Chilean UISA system. It is the first publication on the insurance system 
to use data from a period when the system can be considered to have ‘matured’ rather 
than still being in a process of gradual implementation through the incorporation of new 
contracts.3Our data show that the functioning of the system is highly dependent on the 
employment conditions prevalent in the labour market in which it operates. In 
developing countries with a high proportion of temporary contracts and high levels of 
job rotation among workers with formal jobs, an ISA-based system is unlikely to 
provide much protection against unemployment, especially because the unemployed 
tend to come from the more precarious segments of the labour market. This means that 
other Latin American countries with similarly poor employment conditions are unlikely 
to benefit greatly from copying the Chilean system. 
 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: we begin by explaining the particular 
historical and theoretical context of ISA-based unemployment insurance systems in 
Latin America generally, and in Chile more specifically. We then describe how the 
Chilean UISA system works, before turning to the administrative data to analyse its 
coverage. The concluding section discussesthe extent to which the Chilean UISA 
system can serve as a model for other countries, before closing with more general 
                                                     
3 This point is discussed in more detail later in the article; it is based on Table 2. 
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observations on the relationship between employment conditions and social protection 
systems in developing countries. The article’s conclusions are highly relevant for 
research on welfare states in developing countries, which tends to ignore the important 
link between social protection systems and the labour markets on which they are based 
(Huber, 1996). 
 
Before beginning, we must, however, draw attention to two issues. The first is that like 
all unemployment insurance systems in the world, the Chilean UISA only covers 
salaried workers and not informal workers, who do not contribute to the system, and 
therefore cannot claim benefits.4This article therefore does not discuss informality and 
its relationship with unemployment — a highly complex subject in its own right, which 
cannot be covered here.Second, we deliberately uses the term ‘unemployment insurance 
savings account system’ even though it is a cumbersome expression to illustrate that the 
Chilean system is not really an‘unemployment insurance’ in the traditional sense. As we 
will see from the analysis that follows, the system can better be described as a 
mandatory savings system based on individual accounts with an unemployment 
insurance component.  
 
 
THE CONTEXT OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEMS IN LATIN 
AMERICA  
 
Historical Context  
 
Of all the social protection mechanisms that have been instituted in developed and 
developing countries over the course of history, unemployment insurance is the most 
complicated (and often ideologically contentious) as there are no easily identifiable 
characteristics that make a person eligible for a potential benefit, such as an age limit (as 
with pensions), household structure or income levels (as with benefit payments), or a 
health condition (disability insurance). By contrast, in the case of the unemployed, the 
state has to monitor whether a worker is legitimately unemployed, looking for a new 
job, and available to take advantage of a potential job opportunity. Monitoring the 
                                                     
4 Evidence from panel surveys in Chile show that informal workers rarely become unemployed, 
but instead adjust to economic fluctuations through lower income levels.  
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behaviour of the unemployed is particularly difficult in developing countries, where 
many workers are employed informally or frequently switch between different (and 
sometimes multiple) precarious jobs.5This also explains why most developing countries, 
even those in the higher middle-income bracket, do not establish fully fledged 
unemployment insurance systems, and instead prefer to focus on other social 
programmes such as health insurance, pension systems, or conditional cash transfer 
programmes. Most importantly, the perception that European unemployment insurance 
benefits were overly generous and had created undue moral hazard significantly shaped 
the theoretical and political debates on the subject in Latin America during the 1990s 
and 2000s, as will be discussed below.  
 
Having said this, the problem of unemployment has always been an important subject 
for policymakers in the Latin American region where, historically, frequent economic 
crises have led to bouts of high unemployment. Governments therefore began to 
consider implementing mechanisms that would protect workers against unemployment 
almost as soon as they began instituting basic labour market legislation in the 1920s. 
The logic of protecting workers against unemployment is enshrined in dismissal 
clauses, which generally require employers to give at least one month’s notice, and in 
severance pay mechanisms that require employers to pay one monthly wage (generally) 
per year of service if the worker is made redundant.6 
 
However, aside from debates on whether or to what extent severance pay legislation 
distorts the functions of labour markets in developing countries, it is clear that it does 
not work well as an unemployment ‘insurance’ mechanism.7 First, it does not cover 
workers who have worked informally or for short periods of time under fixed-term 
contracts. Second, it is difficult to enforce severance pay legislation, and we know little 
                                                     
5 The difficulties faced by developing countries in the establishment of functioning 
unemployment insurance systems mirror those experienced by developed countries during the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, when insurance systems suffered from problems of low 
coverage, financing issues (sometimes bankruptcies), and fragmentation (some groups of 
workers were excluded ex-ante from the new systems) (Berg and Salerno, 2008: 88). 
6 A similar logic applies in Asian countries, although the amounts stipulated by severance pay 
legislation vary (Asami, 2013: 28). 
7 For a debate on the disadvantages of severance pay, see for example Heckman and 
Pagés(2000); Holzmann and Vodopivec (2012).   
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about the extent to which it is actually paid in Latin America.8 Critics contend that 
employers use flexible, informal or precarious hiring mechanisms to avoid this 
legislation, which probably leads to unnecessarily high levels of job rotation. In 
addition, we know that severance pay is rarely paid in full as employers gamble that 
workers are unable to face the lengthy and expensive legal process required to enforce 
their rights. Finally, the right to severance payments evidently does not apply if a 
worker resigns voluntarily, or is fired for any form of misconduct.  
 
Given the limited use of severance pay as a protection mechanism in the case of 
unemployment,some countries in Latin America oblige employers to contribute to an 
ISA to make a provision for potential future rights to severance pay. In this case, the 
worker has the right to withdraw funds from the account under any circumstance of job 
loss. This is the case, for example, of the Fundo deGarantia do Tempo e Serviço 
(FGTS) in Braziland the Cuenta Individual de Indemnización(CII) in Ecuador,9or the 
severance pay contributions paid by employers for domestic service workers in Chile. 
These mandatory savings accounts have been operating for many decades, and in fact 
form the basis of the idea that unemployment insurance can be funded through 
ISAs.However, these savings account systems were instituted as a form of severance 
pay. They do not contain a ‘Solidarity Fund’ that pools risk among the unemployed. 
What was innovative about the Chilean system when it was instituted in 2002 was that it 
combined savings accounts with a solidarity pillar.10 
 
Other countries in Latin America have also established limited traditional 
unemployment insurance systems in the past. They include Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 
and Venezuela.11However, their coverage often excludes entire groups of workers from 
the insurance (such as construction workers, domestic or publicsector employees in 
Argentina), and their benefits are limited, both in terms of replacement rates and 
number of payments (Mazza, 2000;Velazquez, 2010). It is the perceived limitation and 
unworkabilityof these traditional unemployment insurance systems in developing 
                                                     
8 More information is available on Asian countries, where payment levels are also low;see 
Asami (2013: 31). 
9 Employee Indemnity Guarantee Fund and Individual Compensation Account, respectively. 
10 For a more detailed discussion of these subtle differences, see Holzmann and 
Vodopivec(2012); Sehnbruch (2006). 
11 A Chilean unemployment benefit scheme also existed prior to 2002, but its benefits were so 
limited that few unemployed workers bothered to claim them (Sehnbruch, 2006). 
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countries with weak institutions and largely informal labour markets that have led 
policymakers in Latin America and elsewhere to look for alternative insurance models. 
 
 
Recent Political Context and Theoretical Debates in Latin America 
 
The origin of the modern theoretical debate on unemployment insurance in Latin 
America lies both in the historical experiences described above and in the 
recommendations made by the Washington Consensus to flexibilize labour markets in 
the region, in particular by reducing or abolishing severance pay mechanisms to boost 
the creation of more and better jobs, especially for low-income workers, women and 
young people (Heckman and Pagés, 2000). However, such reforms are politically 
difficult to implement, as illustrated by the fact that severance pay mechanisms have not 
been reformed or eliminated from Latin American labour legislation.12Their persistence 
has therefore led to the recommendation that severance pay be replaced by functioning 
unemployment insurance mechanisms based on ISAs, which could then function as a 
kind of ‘provision’ against severance pay, and be deducted from any final severance 
payment made (Ferrer and Riddell, 2012).Unemployment insurance is also a part of the 
‘second generation’of reforms recommended by the Washington Consensus institutions 
that advocate improving active labour market policies in developing countries, by 
establishing vocational training programmes and institutions that can better match 
workers and jobs (Inter-American Development Bank, 2004; World Bank, 2013). 
Unemployment insurance is part of this recommended package. 
 
In this context, the existing literature often begins by explaining that unemployment 
insurance constitutes a legitimate space for public policy action because, as historical 
experience in both Europe and Latin America has shown, such an insurance cannot be 
provided through voluntary mechanisms or by private providers, as imperfect 
information systems and adverse selection criteria make the systems unworkable 
(Chetty and Finkelstein, 2012: 2;cited in Vodopivec, 2013: 3).However, this raises the 
question of how unemployment insurance can be optimally designed in developing 
countries, where unemployment is not a ‘discrete’ eventand where job search effort 
                                                     
12Discussions of the reasons for this can be found in Carnes (2014) and Sehnbruch (2012). 
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cannot be monitored.13Workers, for example,can receive benefits from unemployment 
insurance systems while either working informally, or not bothering to look for a job at 
all. This raises the spectre of ‘moral hazard’ as studies from developed countries are 
often extrapolated to developing countries even though analysts recognize that 
unemployment in developing countries is a completely different phenomenon 
(Vodopivec, 2013). Yet, repeatedly, analysts working on optimal social insurance 
design in developed countries are quoted in the literature on developing countries. 
Espino and Sanchez (2013), for example, quote Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992: 118), 
who are referring to a general equilibrium model based on the United States economy, 
when they say that‘if there is moral hazard, and the replacement ratio is not set 




Political Context and Theoretical Debates in Chile  
 
Concerns about moral hazard such as these have profoundly shaped the debate about 
unemployment insurance in Latin America from a theoretical perspective andhave been 
incorporated by the Chilean literature on the subject. They led policy makers to search 
for a new balance between fiscal cost, social insurance and potential mechanisms of 
abuse by combining insurance contributions with ISAs (Acevedo, 2002; Acevedo et al., 
2006; Calvo, 2002;Ministerio del Trabajo, 2000;Solari 2002; Velásquez, 1998).   
In addition to the profound influence of the international literature on Chilean 
policymakers, Chile’s history as a pioneer of privatized social insurance also played a 
role.15 Its pension system based on ISAs was initiated in 1981, and health insurance 
based on individual insurance plans was established in 1983. Any funding mechanism 
for unemployment insurance based on sharing risk among workers was viewed with 
suspicion during the intensely neoliberal public policy atmosphere of the 1980s and 
                                                     
13Vodopivec (2013: 3) uses the term ‘discrete event’ to reflect the fact that in an industrial and 
urbanized society, ‘workers either work or do not work’. He contrasts this with developing 
countries where workers can resort to self- or home production. 
 
14 Similarly, papers by Feldstein and Altman (1998), Orszag and Snower(2002), and Parsons 
(2003) are frequently cited by the development literature on unemployment insurance. 




1990s, which had not yet fully analysed or understood the failings of individualized and 
privatized social insurance.16 In this context, traditional unemployment insurance as it 
existed at the time in Europe was viewed very negatively, especially by employers’ 
associations and the political right, as illustrated by the following quotation from an 
interview in 1993: 
The experience has been extraordinarily negative. The majority of these countries 
— Spain, England, and other nations of Europe, and including the USA, are 
having great trouble reversing these systems, which only tend to encourage 
leisure …. There is an increasingly larger group of people that makes 
arrangements to live off these benefits without any interest whatsoever of 
working in the formal economy. Moreover, many continue working informally 
and earning a double income…. [I]t would be foolish on our part if we should 
wish to apply a system in Chile that has been proven, by other countries that 
came before us, to be wrong and negative.17 
An influential Chilean labour market analyst wrote at the time: ‘it is well-known that 
unemployment insurance systems in Europe have failed’ (Beyer, 2000). This illustrates 
the simplistic arguments into which complex problems were distilled.  
 
The idea of establishing unemployment insurance to protect the unemployed, and 
positive arguments in favour of such a scheme, such as theories related to job–skill 
matching and counter cyclical expenditure, therefore clashed with a political economy 
consensus that was intensely suspicious of any form of state intervention in markets 
(especially labour markets), and of risk sharing. This explains why Chilean literature on 
the subject follows the wider literature mentioned above, andbegins by explaining that 
there is a legitimate role for public policy and the state in the provision of 
unemployment insurance, as it cannot be provided by a private insurance system 
(Acevedo, 2002;Acevedo et al., 2006; Solari, 2002, Velásquez, 2010). 
 
Initial proposals to establish unemployment insurance in Chile were based purely on 
ISAs, andsuggested an additional fiscal subsidy only for those who did not qualify for 
                                                     
16 Although a national health insurance does exist in Chile, financed by contributions from 
lower-income workers and the state, even nowadays there is little shared funding between 
public and private insurers. See Infante and Paraje (2010) for details.  
17 Interview with José Antonio Guzmán, President of the Confederación de la Producción y del 
Comercio (CPC), Chile’s principal employer organization, between 1990 and 1996; in El 
DiarioFinanciero, 19 April, 1993 (quoted in Haagh, 2004: 182). 
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the insurance payments(Ministerio del Trabajo, 2000;Velásquez, 1998, 2010). Until the 
1999 economic crisis, legislative proposals languished on the political backburner. But 
when the unemployment rate in Chile almost doubled within the space of one year to 
over 10 per cent, and clearly hit the most vulnerable workers hardest, unemployment 
insurance became a political priority. Due to lack of data, however, policymakers at the 
time did not realize the extent to which the formal sector of the Chilean labour market 
had become flexibilized through non-traditional contractual mechanisms, such as short-
term, subcontracted, or freelance contracts, or simply through open-ended traditional 
contracts with short durations.18 This was therefore not taken into account when the 
system was originally designed. 
 
The structure of the Chilean UISA discussed in the following section was thus born out 
of a political ideology particular to Chile during the late 1990s, out of a Washington 
Consensus recommendation to flexibilize labour markets (by replacing severance pay 
with a more flexible structure of unemployment insurance), and out of an almost 
complete lack of information on the state of the Chilean labour market. The objective of 
preventing moral hazard outweighed the objective of protecting workers who lost their 
jobs, and led to a system which imposed such stringent conditions of eligibility on 
workers claiming benefits that its coverage of the unemployed turned out to be 
negligible (Sehnbruch, 2013). This explains why a system that was only instituted in 
2002hadto undergo a first reform as early as 2009,in response to the realization that its 
real coverage was minimal.19It was then reformed again in 2015, in an effort to make 
the Solidarity Fund more accessible to the unemployed. 
 
 
                                                     
18 For more detail see Sehnbruch (2006). The UISA was, in fact, designed without any reliable 
information on the types of contracts used, the duration of these contracts or the characteristics 
of workers who became unemployed. The official Chilean labour market survey (Encuesta 
Nacional del Empleo) included questions on the type of contract and on employment duration 
only in 2010. Before then, the Chilean national household survey 
(CaracterizaciónSocioeconómica de Hogares, CASEN) asked about contracts and duration in 
1996. However, the results from this survey show that the survey information and the 
administrative data are very different. 
19A senior official of the Ministry of Labour, who participated in discussions leading up to the 
2009 reform of the UISA, confirmed that even during this reform, the concern of experts over 
the possibility of generating undue moral hazard by making the insurance system more generous 
was predominant and outweighed other considerations. Interview with senior official, Ministry 
of Labour, 8 September 2016. 
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THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHILEAN UISA: GENERAL CONDITIONS, 




The Chilean UISA is a mixed system which is financed by all three social actors — 
government, employers and workers. The system generates two principal funding 
mechanisms: individual savings accounts (ISAs) for each worker financed by 
contributions from the worker and employer in the case of open-ended contracts, and 
only by employers in the case of workers with fixed-term contracts. In addition, the 
system generates an unemploymentSolidarity Fund (Fondo de CesantíaSolidario), 
financed by employers and fiscal contributions (see Table 1 for details). 
 
The contributions that each worker makes to her or hisISA constitute the worker’s 
personal savings, withdrawable only in the case of unemployment, termination of 
contract, retirement or any other event in which the worker leaves or loses her/his job. 
The UISA system establishes different methods of financial contributions depending on 
the type of contract held by a worker. In the case of workers with open-ended contracts, 
employers pay 1.6 per cent of gross wages into the ISAs of their workers, while workers 
pay an additional 0.6 per cent of their gross wages into their ISAs. Over the course of 
one calendar year, these contributions add up to one quarter of a worker’s monthly 
wage. In addition, employers commit 0.8 per cent of their total gross payroll to the 
Solidarity Fund, which also receives fiscal contributions. Both the ISAs and the 
Solidarity Fund are administered by the Sociedad Administradora de Fondos de 
Cesantía (AFC Chile) —the Administration for Unemployment Funds. For workers 
with fixed-term contracts, the contributions to the UISA system are made only by 
employers, and amount to 2.8 per cent of a worker’s gross wage. An additional 
contribution of 0.2 per cent is paid into the Solidarity Fund. 
 
The workers’ payments are limited to a maximum of 11 years. If a worker stays in the 
same job for more than 11 years, contributions to the UISA system cease, as it is 
assumed that 11 years allow for a sufficient accumulation of resources in the ISAsto 
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cover the eventuality of unemployment (Acevedo et al., 2006;Beyer, 2000).20The 
employer’s obligation to contribute to the Solidarity Fund, however, remains until the 
end of the working relationship. 
 
[Typesetter, please insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here] 
 
 
Benefits Paid by the UISA 
 
To withdraw money from the UISA system, workers are required to have contributed to 
it (not necessarily continuously) for 12 months in the case of workers with open-ended 
contracts, and for six months over the course of the last 24 months in the case of 
workers with short-term contracts. In either case, the last three contributions have to 
have been continuous and from the same employer. Workers must be between 18 and 
65 years of age, and have been unemployed for at least 30 days. The amount and 
number of payments that can be withdrawn from the individual savings account 
therefore depends on the type of contract held by a worker prior to becoming 
unemployed, on the amount accumulated in the worker’s ISA, and, on the cause of 
dismissal.If a worker changes jobs without passing through a period of unemployment 
in between, his status in the UISA system is reset. Funds can then be either withdrawn 
from the savings account or left in the account for future use. In either case this does not 
affect the obligation of the new employer to contribute to the insurance system. 
 
Prior to 2016, replacement rates decreased in increments of 5 percentage points from 50 
per cent to 20 per cent over a maximum period of seven months. As of 2016, 
replacement rates were set at 70 per cent, decrease at the same rate of 5 per cent until a 
minimum of 30 per cent. If a worker has sufficient savings the number of withdrawals 
that can be made is unlimited, although after the seventh month of unemployment the 
replacement rate is maintained constant at 30 per cent.If the funds accumulated in a 
worker’s individual savings account are insufficient to fund a period of 
unemployment,and if the worker was dismissed for economic reasons (i.e. through no 
                                                     
20The cap of 11 years on unemployment insurance payments is also related to the structure of 
severance pay in Chile, which is set at one month’s wage per year of service, with a limit of 11 
months’ wages. Since accumulated savings from the unemployment insurance system are 
deducted from severance pay liability, the insurance legislation matched this time period. 
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fault of his own), he has the right to obtain additional benefits from the system’s 
Solidarity Fund. The amount and number of payments made by the Solidarity Fund 
provide replacement rates for up to five months that are equal to what a worker would 
obtain from his or her ISA. However, these payments are subject to legal minimum and 
maximum amounts (see Table 1).Unemployed workers thus only receive payments from 
the Solidarity Fund if their own savings are insufficient to cover their period of 
unemployment. Workers who resign from their job only have the right to receive 
payments from their ISA, but not from the Solidarity Fund. It is this inclusion of a 
Solidarity Fund that distinguishes the Chilean UISA system from other unemployment 
insurance systems in Latin America and that led to its description as a model for other 
developing countries. 
 
Beneficiaries of the UISA system are also automatically registered with municipal 
employment intermediation offices (Oficina Municipal de Intermediación Laboral— 
OMIL). For this purpose a national employment exchange was created (Bolsa Nacional 
de Empleo), which facilitates the process of employment placement services by 
municipal administrations, thus contributing to a better match between employment 
demand and supply. Unemployed workers receiving insurance payments and made 
redundant for economic reasons have preferential access to vocational training 
programmes offered by Chile’s national training and employment service, the Servicio 
Nacional de Capacitación y Empleo (SENCE). Unemployment insurance payments 
cease if a worker refuses a place on a vocational training programme offered and 
financed by the SENCE. Similarly, insurance payments are suspended if a worker 
rejects, without justification, an employment opportunity (with a salary equal or 
superior to 50 per cent of his or her last wage) offered by a local municipal employment 
intermediation office. 
 
This UISA system operates in parallel to the severance pay legislation, which entitles 
workers with open-ended contracts who are made redundant to one month’s wage per 
year of employment duration with a maximum of 11 months’ wages. The UISA system 
does not affect severance pay entitlements, except for the fact that contributions made 
by the employer to a worker’s ISA are deducted from them. UISA contributions can 
therefore be regarded by employers as a provision for future severance payment 
costs.The four main factors that determine benefits received from the UISA are the 
reason for unemployment, the duration of the previous job, its wage level, and the 
14 
 
contractual status the worker had prior to becoming unemployed (open-ended or fixed-
term contracts). These are therefore the conditions that we have to take into account 
when analysing the empirical evidence that relates to the functioning of the Chilean 
unemployment insurance system. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE CHILEAN UISA  
 
The Coverage of the Chilean UISA:Real Usage 
 
The question of how many workers benefit from the system and under what conditions 
is, of course, crucial to understanding how the Chilean UISA system works, and 
whether it should serve as a model for other developing countries. In this section, we 
first examine the real usage that is made of the system in terms of how many workers 
contribute and actually receive benefits from the system. As the level of benefits 
claimed are low, we then proceed to simulate the hypothetical coverage of the UISA, i.e. 
how many workers are theoretically covered even if they do not make a claim when 
becoming unemployed. 
 
Since the UISA system was instituted in 2002, only formal employment contracts that 
entered into effect after November 2002 become part of the UISA. As we can see from 
Table 2, which is based on the annual reports published by the Superintendent of 
Pensions in Chile, the insurance now covers 52 percent of the total labour force, and 
over 75 per cent of the eligible salaried labour force.21 Workers not covered by the 
insurance are the self-employed, public sector employees (including the military and 
police), who are subject to a different Labour Code, as well as domestic service workers 
(who have a severance pay system to which employers contribute). 
 
In terms of methodology, this article uses a random 5 per cent sample of all workers 
affiliated to the system, which constitutes around 4.4 million contributors for the year 
                                                     
21 Note that this calculation relates the administrative data from the UISA to data from Chile’s 
official labour force survey, the Nueva Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (NENE)to arrive at an 
approximate calculation of real coverage. 
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2015.22The available database follows individuals from the moment they make their 
first contribution to the system and includes their monthly contribution histories until 
December 2015. To analyse these data, we constructed two different databases from the 
sample: the first (sample 1) uses cross-sectional data from the month of November23 for 
each year, and the second (sample 2) compiles data on all of the employment 
relationships that terminated in a given year. The second sample therefore allows us to 
analyse the employment conditions of workers who subsequently become unemployed 
or stop contributing to the system. All the tables in the article specify whether they are 
using the full database or one of the two samples. 
 
Table 3shows that due to the gradual process of incorporating new contracts, the 
proportion of fixed-term contracts (which rotate more frequently) initially outweighed 
the proportion of open-ended contracts. However, by 2005, these proportions inverted, 
and open-ended contracts became the majority. By 2015, 70 per cent of workers had an 
open-ended contract, while 30 per centwere hired on a fixed-term basis. The data show 
that the characteristics of contributors to the UISA stabilized after 2009, with few 
significant changes in the composition of the data since then. This is an important point 
to bear in mind, as it means that studies of the UISA which use data from prior years 
may be significantly biased due to the evolving nature of the insurance system.24 
 
It is clear from Table 3that the employment conditions of workers with open-ended and 
fixed-term contracts can vary significantly. On average, fixed-term contracts earn only 
62 per cent of the average wages of open-ended contracts or 69 per cent of their median 
earnings (2015). Similarly, the duration of fixed-term contracts is much lower, at 10 
months on average compared to the average duration of almost 40months for open-
ended contracts.  
 
                                                     
22 This random sample of administrative data is provided in anonymized form by the Chilean 
Supervisory Agency of the pension system (Superintendencia de Pensiones). 
23 We have chosen the month of November rather than the year end month of December as 
December employment data in Chile are affected by the entrance of seasonal workers into the 
labour market; this positively distorts participation rates and negatively distorts the distribution 
of contracts as seasonal workers are overwhelmingly hired on a short-term basis. 




Table 3 also shows differences between the average duration of periods of non-
contribution for workers who had open-ended or fixed-term contracts. In this context, 
we must note that we cannot assume that workers are necessarily unemployed while 
they are not contributing to the UISA. Since we have no information on what they are 
actually doing while they are not contributing, we have to consider that they may be 
unemployed, working informally or inactive. It is important to emphasize this point as 
studies of the UISA that analyse whether the system generates moral hazard or not 
simply assume that workers are unemployed while they are not contributing.25 From 
Table 3we can see that fixed-term workers on average spend six months not 
contributing to the UISA, and over 50 per cent of them do not contribute to the UISA 
for longer than three months. Workers with open-ended contracts, on the other hand, 
spend an average of just under twomonths not contributing between jobs, and 16.6 per 
cent of them take longer than three months to start contributing again from a new job. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to analyse these differences in more detail as we do not 
know whether workers are genuinely unemployed while they are not contributing. 
 
[Typesetter, please insert Table 3 and Table 4 about here] 
 
 
Table 4 shows that of all the workers who stop contributing to the system26(either due to 
unemployment, informal work or inactivity), only 28 per cent actually made an 
insurance claim in 2015, almost all of which were approved.27 Of these workers, 62.5 
per cent had fixed-term contracts, while 37.5 per cent had open-ended contracts prior to 
becoming unemployed, which illustrates that workers who stop contributing to the 
                                                     
25 See for example Fajnzylber and Poblete (2011);Huneeus et al. (2012); Reyes et al. (2011). 
The fact that we do not know what workers are doing while not contributing to the UISA system 
extends to those workers who may be claiming benefits from the system. This is also true for 
workers claiming benefits from the Solidarity Fund, who, theoretically, must be actively looking 
for work, and who must accept job offers with particular criteria (see details in Table 1). These 
conditions do not, however, preclude workers from working informally elsewhere. 
26 Defined as workers who stopped contributing to the system for longer than one month during 
a given year. 
27Of the remainder, 8.2 per cent of the benefits requested are rejected because workers are still 
in a current employment relationship at the time they make their claim (i.e. they are not 
unemployed according to the register of contributions); 4.4 per cent are rejected because the job 
for which the worker is claiming benefits is not the last job registered by the UISA database; 
and 2.5 per cent are rejected because the system shows that previous claims made are still 
outstanding. There are other reasons for which claims are rejected, such as the claimant never 
contributed to the UISA or the employer is not registered in the system, but these reasons add 
up to less than 1per cent of total claims.  
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UISA system are much more likely to have had a fixed-term contract. Of these 
beneficiaries, 15.3 per cent receive some form of payout from the Solidarity Fund once 
they have used up savings accumulated in their ISAs. If we unpick this figure, we see 
that this proportion is higher for workers who had open-ended contracts (20.4 per cent) 
but lower for workers who had fixed-term contracts (9.4 per cent). Table 4 also shows 
that, on average, workers received 2.2 payments from the UISA system with an average 
replacement rate of 44.4 per cent. 
 
From Table 4 we can see that few workers who stop contributing to the UISA system 
actually apply for and receive benefits (just over 25 per cent). If we then look at how 
many of these workers actually receivepayouts from the Solidarity Fund, this proportion 
decreases to 15.3 per cent.The data further indicate that the 2009 reform of the UISA 
system did not significantly increase either its level of payouts, or the proportion of 
workers benefiting from the Solidarity Fund. 
 
In part, this figure is so low because 43 per cent of workers who are entitled to 
payments from theSolidarity Fund do not claim these benefits(Huneeus et al., 2012). 
These data are consistent with reports from other experts (Fajnzylber and Poblete, 2011; 
Reyes et al., 2011) and with survey data (ConsejoAsesor, 2008).The reasons for this low 
level of claims are not clear. Although the Ministry of Labour tried to research this 
question through a survey that was applied to contributors in the system, the response 
rate was too low for the survey’s conclusions to be considered reliable, and they have 
not been made public.28 
 
Again, and as discussed above, one possible explanation for the low take-up rate is that 
workers are not actually unemployed when they do not contribute to the system. It also 
seems that workers on average expect to spend only two months without contributing to 
the system (ConsejoAsesor, 2008) so may therefore not bother to make a claim. Lack of 
information about the UISA system and how to make a claim may also be a problem. 
Similarly, low replacement rates (38–44 per cent according to Table 4) and the 
conditions requiring workers to register with employment offices (and potentially have 
to accept jobs that are offered) may put workers off. In addition, Huneeus et al. (2012) 
                                                     
28Interview with senior official from Ministry of Labour, September 2016. 
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present strong evidence that workers who decide not to claim UISA benefits despite 
having the right to do so have a higher probability of finding a new job.29 
 
 
The Coverage of the Chilean UISA:The Hypothetical Case 
 
Given that the levels of benefit claims of the Chilean UISA are so low, it is important to 
ask whether workers are at least hypothetically covered by the system, even if they 
choose not to claim benefits. In this section, we therefore analyse these low levels of 
usage from two perspectives: first, we examine how the history of the workers’ 
contributions relates to the conditions imposed by the UISA system under which 
workers may benefit from its insurance component (Table 5). Second, we look at other 
characteristics of workers, such as their age, sex, or level of education, to analyse which 
workers are more likely to benefit from the system (Table 6). 
 
Table 5 simulates the potential coverage by the UISA system of those people who stop 
contributing to the insurance system in a given year (the potentially ‘unemployed’), and 
who should therefore be entitled to receive some form of benefit, provided they have 
accumulated enough savings in their individual accounts, either from their prior job or 
from previous jobs. This means that we simulate the level of benefits that workers 
would receive if everybody who stops contributing to the system actually made a claim. 
By contrast, Table 4 lookedonly at actual claims made in the system. 
 
We constructed Table 5 by examining the relationship between the different types of 
contracts that workers had before ceasing their contributions to the UISA system, the 
reasons why their employment relationship ended, and the level of contributions that 
must be made to the system before being able to claim benefits. We found that if all 
workers who stopped contributing to the insurance system during 2015 made a claim, 
only half of these workers would actually receive a payment from the system. Of this 
universe of potential claimants, 51 per cent would receive a benefit from the Solidarity 
Fund, while the remaining beneficiaries would have accumulated enough savings in 
their ISAs to receive payments from these accounts.The other 50 per centof the workers 
who stop contributing to the system would not receive a payment from the system: they 
                                                     
29 See also Fajnzylber and Poblete (2011) for details on these arguments. 
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have not accumulated enough contributions in their ISAs to be entitled to a payout. This 
result can be explained by the fact that a high percentage of those workers who do 
become ‘unemployed’ had fixed-term contracts in their previous jobs during which they 
did not accumulate sufficient contributions in their ISAs to be able to claim benefits. 
This fact is supported by the evidence presented in Table 3, which showed that 50 per 
cent of fixed-term contractsdo not even last three months. One potential reason why the 
administrative data presented in Table 4 show that a significant proportion of 
‘unemployed’ workers never claim benefits may therefore be that these workers know 
when they leave a job that they do not have sufficient savings accumulated in their ISAs 
to make a worthwhile claim.  
 
[Typesetter, please insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The results inTable 5 are different from the results presented in Table 4, because our 
simulation uses the entire universe of potentially unemployed workers and examines 
their rights to benefits, rather than just looking at those workers who actually receive 
benefits. It is important to examine the data from this perspective, because these results 
eliminate the self-selection bias included in Table 4 that is introduced by the fact that 
the real payments made by the system are only made to people who actually claim 
benefits. Overall, the combined results of Table 4 and Table 5 show that few 
‘unemployed’ workers actually benefit from the ‘insurance component’of the UISA 
system, i.e. from some form of payment from the Solidarity Fund. This prompts the 
question of whether there are other characteristics particular to the worker that might 
explain whether or not he or she receives benefits from the system. 
 
In Table 6, we describe the sample for 2015 by the groups defined in Table 5. The first 
thing to note is that there appear to be differences between the groups, and the 
differences are related to what it is expected of the Chilean labour market. Around a 
third of all workers are women, but workers with open-ended contracts and with access 
to the Solidarity Fund show a higher concentration of women, while the fixed-term 
workers without access include only 25 per cent of women. As expected, people who 
have enough savings in their ISAs and who therefore do not need the Solidarity Fund 
are older, more educated, with higher wages and more stable jobs. This is particularly 
true for the open-ended contracts, with an income which is double that of the next 
highest income level. In terms of economic sectors, the stronger relation appears to be 
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with the type of contract, with a concentration of fixed-term contracts in agriculture and 
construction, and a concentration of open-end contracts in commerce and real estate. 
For the category of open-ended contracts with enough savings, there is a higher than 
average concentration of workers in mining, manufacturing, financial services and 
public administration. 
 
[Typesetter, please insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Finally, Table 7 uses probit regressions to study the relationship between the variables 
described in Table 6 and the probability of actually using the UISAfor workers from 
2010 onwards. Table 7 includes three regressions: for all workers in sample 2;for only 
those workers who have the right to access the UISA; and for workers with right to 
access the Solidarity Fund.30As expected, having an open-ended contract is positively 
related with using the UISA. The same is true for age and income. When considering 
the whole sample, having higher education is related to a lower probability of using the 
UISA, but once aworker has the right to the Solidarity Fund, having higher education is 
positively related to using the UISA. In terms of economic activities, among workers 
with the right to use the Solidarity Fund, there is a higher relative presence of the 
fisheries and construction sectors, and a lower presence of teachers. The duration of the 
employment relationship has a positive impact, as does the duration of the latest pause, 
which has a stronger relationship among people with a right to the Solidarity Fund. 
 
At first glance, these results seem counterintuitive, as one would expect workers with 
lower levels of income to be more likely to claim benefits from the insurance system. 
The data, however, make sense if we relate them to Table 5, which shows that many of 
the ‘unemployed’ do not accumulate enough contributions in their ISAs to be able to 
receive benefits from the system.31 
 
[Typesetter, please insert Table 7 about here] 
 
 
                                                     
30The results show the point estimate for each regression. Marginal effects are available on 
request. 
31 We need a longer period of data from the unemployment insurance database after 2009 to be 
able to determine more specific details about how contribution trajectories influence the 





The Chilean case illustrates how difficult it is to establish a functioning unemployment 
insurance in developing countries that guarantees appropriate levels of coverage and 
benefits, has low administrative costs, and provides the right balance of incentives 
between protecting the income levels of the unemployed and avoiding any kind of 
abuse. To establish which lessons other developing countries can learn from the Chilean 
case, in particular from its hybrid nature that combines both ISAs with a risk-sharing 
mechanism, we must consider several aspects. 
 
First, we must question whether the system genuinely succeeds in avoiding moral 
hazard in the way it was expected to do. As discussed throughout the text, examining 
this issue is difficult as we do not know whether people who stop contributing to the 
system are genuinely unemployed or not. Initial studies carried out by experts suggest 
that some degree of moral hazard is operating among users of the Solidarity fund 
(Huneeus et al., 2012; Reyes et al., 2011). This finding would suggest that moral hazard 
can never be entirely avoided in unemployment insurance systems, even when the 
actual insurance component of the system (the Solidarity Fund) is quite limited. 
Whether this finding is conclusive is doubtful, however, mainly because we know so 
little about why the vast majority of potential beneficiaries from the system never claim 
benefits. Further research on the behaviour of those workers who stop contributing is 
needed to be able to come to more reliable conclusions.32While the question about 
moral hazard is therefore theoretically interesting, it is not relevant in the context of a 
UISA system in which only 1.5 per cent of the ‘unemployed’ receive a benefit from its 
insurance component. 
 
The second important lesson that developing countries can learn from the Chilean case 
is how difficult it is to construct functioning social protection systems based on 
contributions from formal employment in a labour market that is highly precarious. The 
Chilean government has recognized and responded to this difficulty by twice reforming 
a system which has only been operational since 2002 and initially provided even more 
                                                     
32 Once the 2015 reform of the UISA system has been operating for at least a year and a more 




limited coverage. The Chilean UISA system would probably work quite well in a labour 
market in which long-term, stable employment relationships predominate. However, the 
reality of most developing countries is that even their formal labour markets are 
relatively precarious. The high proportion of short-term contracts prevalent in the 
Chilean labour market combined with high levels of job rotation of all contracts, but 
especially of short-term contracts, means that those workers who are most likely to 
become unemployed are the least likely to accumulate sufficient benefits to cover an 
extended period of unemployment. Given current job rotation levels in Chile, it would 
therefore be difficult for any unemployment insurance (traditional or otherwise) to 
provide adequate coverage. Whether other countries should copy the Chilean model or 
not therefore depends on the characteristics of their own labour markets. 
 
While the current UISA system could probably be improved further by reducing 
contribution requirements and increasing potential benefit levels, the current system is 
neither particularly onerous in terms of its eligibility criteria, nor particularly stingy in 
terms of its replacement rates if compared with other systems in developing countries. 
Furthermore, making the Chilean UISA more generous is unlikely to solve the 
fundamental problem generated by the high levels of job rotation in the Chilean labour 
market. As it seems that other developing countries, especially in the Latin American 
region, have similar problems with job turnover(Banco Central de Chile, 2016: 27) we 
must therefore emphasize that more traditional mechanisms of social protection such as 
emergency employment programmes or conditional cash transfer programmes are still 
essential to preventing families from falling below the poverty line when household 
members become unemployed, especially during times of high unemployment rates or 
economic crisis. 
 
Finally, policymakers attempting to copy the Chilean UISA system in other developing 
countries must also remember that it was established in a very particularpolitical 
economy context. As this article has highlighted, the historical moment during which 
the system was designed meant that policymakers were more concerned with whether 
an insurance system would generate moral hazard rather than whether it would protect 
the unemployed from significant drops in income levels. 
 
Overall, the Chilean case illustrates theimportance of the interrelationship between the 
conditions of a social security system and the employment conditions on which it is 
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based. If employment conditions are too precarious, social security systems cannot 
function appropriately. This means that contribution-based systems without sufficient 
risk-sharing components between potential beneficiaries can significantly increase the 
need for fiscal contributions from governments in developing countries with limited 
resources, especially during periods of high unemployment when governments must 
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